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Resumo
O Tratado sobre a Proibição de Armas Nucleares (TPAN) foi aberto para assinaturas 
em 2017, e em outubro de 2019 o tratado tinha 79 signatários. No entanto, 
nenhum Estado Nuclearmente Armado assinou o tratado. Este artigo argumenta 
que o TPAN é tanto uma inovação no regime de não proliferação de armas 
nucleares quanto um tratado inadequado para atingir seu objetivo devido à 
falta de apoio das grandes potências do sistema internacional, bem como à 
ausência dos principais países capazes de determinar ou influenciar o sistema 
internacional em questões relacionadas a armas nucleares. Na primeira seção 
do artigo, o escopo e os objetivos do tratado são abordados, e a seção seguinte 
apresenta uma análise dos perfis dos signatários do TPNW. A última seção 
contém uma visão prospectiva do tratado.
Abstract
The Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) was opened for 
signature on 2017, and in October 2019 the treaty had 79 signatories. However, 
no one Nuclear-Weapon State has signed the treaty. This article argues that 
the TPNW is both an innovation in the nuclear nonproliferation regime and a 
treaty that is unfitted to achieve its objective due the lack of support from the 
major powers of the international system, as well as the absence of the main 
countries that could determine or influence the international system on issues 
related to nuclear weapons. In the first section of the article, the scope and 
objectives of the treaty are addressed, and the following section presents an 
analysis of the profiles of the TPNW signatories. The last section contains a 
prospective view of the treaty.
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Introduction
After the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), the humanitarian dimension of and the risks associated with nuclear weapons come to the attention of a large number of academics and organizations 
concerned with nuclear weapons. This was reflected in fora as the United Nations, culminating in 
three conferences on the Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear Weapons held between 2013 and 2014: 
Oslo (March 2013), Nayarit (February 2014) and Vienna (December 2014) (See Austria, 2014). The 
Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) is the result of a process initiated with these 
Conferences. This process was consolidated on December 5, 2016, when the United Nations adopted 
resolution A/RES/71/75, in which the General Assembly addressed the issue of an international 
convention on the prohibition of the use or threat of the use of nuclear weapons.
By this Resolution, the General Assembly expressed the desire of the majority of the U.N member 
states to start negotiations on a legally binding instrument to prohibit the development, production, 
stockpiling, and use of nuclear weapons aiming its full eradication. 
On December 23, 2016 the General Assembly adopted Resolution A/RES/71/258, which “Decides 
to convene in 2017 the United Nations Conference to negotiate a legally binding instrument to ban 
nuclear weapons, leading towards their total elimination.”
In this same resolution, the General Assembly decided that the proposed conference would be held 
in two rounds: from March 27 to 31 and from June 15 to July 7, 2017. However, the Nuclear-Weapon 
States1 (NWS) — de facto and de jure — and most of their allies chose not to join in the negotiations 
and works.
After these two rounds of negotiations (March 27–31, 2017 and June 15–July 7, 2017) at the 
UN General Assembly, the TPNW was adopted on July 7, 2017 by a vote of 122 states in favor, with 
one vote against — the Netherlands — and one abstention — Singapore (UNODA, TPNW, Treaty 
Overview). It is worth noting that all the NWS boycotted the two rounds of negotiation and works, 
as did many countries that rely to some degree on nuclear deterrence for security and defense.
The TPNW was opened for signature on September 20, 2017, with 50 Signatory States. A seemingly 
promising start to a treaty focused on one of the hottest issues in international relations.
The TPNW has reinvigorated the debate on nuclear disarmament. To its supporters, it is a 
normative advance that stigmatizes the development and possession of nuclear weapons (Sauer, 2016) 
and could lead to international pressure to compel the NWS to conform to “the new global norm” 
and begin actions to eliminate their nuclear weapons (Perkovich, 2017). On the other hand, the 
criticisms of the TPNW are many and can be summarized in the explanation of a joint vote, against 
1 According to Article IX, item 3 of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), "a nuclear-weapon State is one 
which has manufactured and exploded a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device prior to 1 January 1967 ". Therefore, USA, 
Soviet Union, (now Russia), United Kingdom, France and China are Nuclear-Weapon States de jure. However, Israel, India, Pakistan 
and North Korea are also Nuclear-Weapon States de facto. (See, UNODA. Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons – NPT, 
Text of the Treaty. <https://www.un.org/disarmament/wmd/nuclear/npt/text/>. Accessed on July 19, 2019).
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the resolution L.41 of the First Committee of the U.N. General Assembly2, made by representatives 
of France, the United Kingdom, and the United States, on October 27, 2016:
This proposed ban fails to take into account the requisite security considerations and 
this will not eliminate nuclear weapons. It will contravene a consensus-based approach, 
which for several decades has been able to allow us to implement and strengthen the 
NPT regime with its three pillars, and this will deepen the divide amongst NPT states’ 
parties who are committed to pursuing a world without nuclear weapons (France, United 
Kingdom & United States, 2016).
Despite these complaints and absentees, the TPNW was adopted on July 7, 2017, and, by October 
13, 2019, the treaty had 79 signatories, 32 of which ratified it (UNODA, TPNW, Status of the Treaty). 
However, no NWS has signed the treaty. In addition, only 5 of the 33 countries that use nuclear power 
reactors for electricity generation have signed the TPNW. This means that the countries that actually 
use nuclear energy, mainly for peaceful purposes, did not join the TPNW. In this context, it may be 
questioned: Could an international treaty that aims the total elimination of nuclear weapons – but 
does not have participation of any NWS nor the main countries that can determine or influence the 
international system on this subject – has the chance to reach its goals? What is the involvement of 
the Signatories States of this treaty with nuclear power?
These questions led to the main question of the paper: Is the TPNW an innovation capable of 
driving the nuclear disarmament agenda, or is it a politically correct but innocuous effort? 
Theories related to whether international treaties without support of the major powers3 may 
have their goals achieved are central to this paper. The issue is part of the debate on the success 
possibility of multilateral new norms and treaties contrary to the interests of the major powers and 
most powerful states in the international system. Some International Relations theories as the realism 
and the institutionalism – and its variants – consider that the international cooperation is drove by 
the powers with military, economic, and diplomatic resources to manage and enforce it (See Ikenberry 
and Kupchan 1990; and De Nevers 2007).
Therefore, according to these theories, for a multilateral treaty to be able to achieve its objectives, 
it must have the support of these predominant actors in the international system. 
On the other hand, constructivist theorists argue that multilateral treaties, even without support 
of the major powers, may serve as effective instruments for the promotion of new norms in the 
international system (See Brunnée and Toope 2010; and Bower, 2017).
In his book entitled Norms without the Great Powers: International Law and Changing Social 
Standards in World Politics (2017), Adam Stephen Bower examines treaties that have been concluded 
without great powers support and evaluates their success regarding the proposed, changed or discarded 
2 It is worth noting that Resolution L.41 led to the already mentioned Resolution A/RES/71/258 adopted on December 23, 2016, in 
which the General assembly decided “to convene in 2017 the United Nations Conference to negotiate a legally binding instrument 
to ban nuclear weapons, leading towards their total elimination.”
3 By “major power” or “great power” I mean the small group of states “that can, alone, exercise a large, perhaps decisive, impact 
on the international system” (Keohane, 1969, pp. 296).
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norms in their goals. The author analyzes the Mine Ban Treaty (MBT) and the Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court (ICC) as case studies in which multilateral treaties were negotiated, 
opened for signatures, and entered into force without the support of major powers. According to 
Bower, both treaties reshaped expectations and behavior in their respective domains, and their 
respective norms were internalized even by the non-Signatory States.
It is worth noting that the MBT was opened for signature in 1997, and as of October 2019, 164 
countries have ratified the treaty (UNTC, MBT Treaty). The ICC was adopted in 1998, and in 2019, 
137 countries signed it (UNTC, ICC Statute). The two treaties were negotiated, opened for signature 
and entered into force with no support from countries such as USA, Russia, China and India, but 
with support from France and the United Kingdom, as well as most European countries and Japan, 
Canada, Australia and others.
In this sense, considering that the permanent members of the United Nations Security Council 
are major powers, in both cases – the MBT and the ICC – there were at least two major powers as 
signatories (France and UK), as well as a large number of countries with political, economic and 
military weight. In other words, the MBT and ICC were born with the support of countries capable 
of significantly influencing the international system.
In this context, as a counterpoint to the optimist view defended by Bower, it is argued that the 
TPNW is both an innovation in the nuclear nonproliferation regime and a treaty that is unfitted to 
achieve its objective due the lack of support from the major powers of the international system, as 
well as the absence of the main countries that could determine or influence the international system 
on issues related to nuclear weapons.
To pursue answers to the proposed question and corroborate the formulated assumption, this 
paper proceeds in three steps. Firstly, it summarizes the scope and objectives of the treaty. Secondly, 
it presents an analysis of the profiles of the TPNW signatories, the analytical axes of which are their 
involvement with nuclear power and their ability to influence the international system on issues related 
to nuclear weapons. The third section contains a brief synthesis of the major absent states – non-
signatories – and a prospective view of the treaty in light of its scope and current Signatory States. 
In summary, the paper contributes to the studies on nuclear disarmament, focusing on the 
TPNW and underlying the debates and studies on the banning of nuclear weapons. Quality studies 
have already been produced in relation to the question of the legitimacy of nuclear weapons and 
the ways in which they can be proscribed (see Perkovich and Acton, 2009). However, there is still a 
lack of studies on the TPNW and its contribution, or irrelevance, to the issue, mainly because it is a 
recent treaty, and its impact has not yet fully manifested and whose chances of success are yet to be 
discussed and assessed. It is in this context that this study is presented.
Following these introductory considerations and before beginning the above-mentioned sections, 
it is important to address some concepts used in the text, that is, to define some of the lexicon used here, 
mainly the typology used to classify states in relation to their ability to influence the international system.
Robert Keohane presented a typology for classifying states with a focus on the systemic role of 
states. According to this, Keohane (1969, pp. 295–296) points out that States are positioned in one 
of the following categories:
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—   System-Determining States: encompasses the states that play “a critical role in shaping the 
system”. Good examples of this kind of state are the USA and the USSR during the time of 
the bipolar system in the Cold War years. 
—   System-Influencing States: constituted by those states which cannot be expected to dominate 
the system but may nevertheless be able “to influence its nature through unilateral as well 
as multilateral actions”.
—   System-Affecting States: formed by those states that cannot affect the system acting alone but 
can “nevertheless exert significant impact on the system by working through small groups 
or alliances or through universal or regional international organizations.”
—   System-Ineffectual States: in which are found the “states that can do little to influence the 
system-wide forces that affect them.” Keohane (1969, pp. 296) emphasizes that for these 
system-ineffectual states “foreign policy is adjustment to reality, not rearrangement of it.”
This typology, which was published in 1969, may seem outdated. However, it fits in perfectly 
with the objectives of this paper, especially for the analysis of the profiles of the TPNW signatories 
and their ability to influence the international system on issues related to nuclear weapons.
Once having made these introductory considerations, which are intended mainly to define the 
lexicon used in this paper, the following section will start to address the scope and objectives of the TPNW.
The scope and objectives of the TPNW
The text of the TPNW consists of a preamble and 20 articles (UNODA, TPNW, Text of the 
Treaty). The preamble of the TPNW presents a humanitarian approach and emphasizes concern not 
only “about the catastrophic humanitarian consequences that would result from any use of nuclear 
weapons”, but also the “risks posed by the continued existence of nuclear weapons”. The preamble 
also highlights the concern about “the slow pace of nuclear disarmament”, the persistent possibility 
of using nuclear weapons in military doctrines, and the waste of resources in programs to acquire, 
maintain, develop, and modernize these weapons. In this context, the preamble emphasizes that:
[…] a legally binding prohibition of nuclear weapons constitutes an important contribution 
towards the achievement and maintenance of a world free of nuclear weapons, including 
the irreversible, verifiable and transparent elimination of nuclear weapons, […] (UNODA, 
TPNW, Text of the Treaty).
It should be noted that the preamble reaffirms that the NPT is “the cornerstone of the nuclear 
disarmament and non-proliferation regime” and has a vital role in the peace and security of the 
international system. In addition, it is emphasized that nothing in the TPNW text shall be interpreted 
as a way to restrain the rights of the States Party to it to research and use nuclear power peacefully. 
The 20 articles that constitute the TPNW follow the preamble.
In Article 1, the prohibitions to which every State Party to the treaty is committed are clearly 
expressed. The treaty prohibits each State Party to develop, test, produce, manufacture, acquire, 
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possess, stockpile, transfer or receive control over nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, 
either directly or indirectly, and to either use or threaten to use nuclear weapons or other nuclear 
explosive devices.
In summary, the essential provisions of Article 1 of the TPNW constitute a series of categorical 
bans (“never under any circumstances”) related to nuclear weapons.
Articles 2, 3, and 4 are basically a road map for the renunciation of nuclear weapons. The 
Article 2 provides that each State Party shall submit to the Secretary-General of the United Nations 
a declaration reporting 
[…] whether it owned, possessed or controlled nuclear weapons or nuclear explosive devices 
and eliminated its nuclear-weapon programme, including the elimination or irreversible 
conversion of all nuclear-weapons-related facilities, prior to the entry into force of this 
Treaty for that State Party (UNODA, TPNW, Text of the Treaty).
To verify that nuclear weapons are being destroyed and that all nuclear material is kept safe 
while avoiding diversion, Article 3 requires all treaty members to adopt specific safeguard agreements, 
supervised by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).
Article 4 offers states the opportunity to accede to the Treaty even though they still possess 
nuclear weapons or such weapons are present in their territory, provided that those states “immediately 
remove them from operational status, and destroy them as soon as possible but not later than a deadline 
to be determined by the first meeting of State Parties […]” (UNODA, TPNW, Text of the Treaty).
In light of Articles 2, 3, and 4, it is understood that, although the treaty has been negotiated by 
Non-Nuclear Weapon States (NNWS), it seeks to provide conditions to enable states that either possess 
nuclear weapons or allow other states to store them in their territory to join the treaty. To do so, the 
treaty offers two paths: States can destroy their stocks before joining the treaty; or they can accede to 
the treaty and then start a planned disarmament process, that is, with defined targets and deadlines.
The Article 5 provides that each State Party shall take all measures – including penal sanctions 
against any person that undertakes activities prohibited to a State Party under the TPNW.
Articles 6 and 7 deal with the provisions relating to Victim Assistance and Environmental 
Remediation as well as International Cooperation and Assistance to facilitate the implementation 
of the TPNW, and to “provide assistance for the victims of the use or testing of nuclear weapons or 
other nuclear explosive devices” (UNODA, TPNW, Text of the Treaty).
The subject of Article 8 is the Meeting of State Parties, and it establishes biannual meetings, in 
addition to review conferences every six years. These meetings will enable states to assess progress 
in the implementation and universalization of the treaty.
Articles 9–11 deal with the costs and payments of these meetings, as well as the way to propose 
amendments to the treaty and the settlement of disputes.
Article 12 clarifies the goal of achieving the universality of TPNW: “Each State Party shall 
encourage States not party to this Treaty to sign, ratify, accept, approve, or accede to the Treaty, with 
the goal of universal adherence of all States to the Treaty” (UNODA, TPNW, Text of the Treaty).
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Articles 13 and 14 deal with signature, ratification, acceptance, and approval of, and accession 
to the treaty.
The other articles of the treaty deal largely with details of their legal aspects. Article 15 specifies 
that the TPNW “shall enter into force 90 days after the fiftieth instrument of ratification, acceptance, 
approval, or accession has been deposited”. Article 16 remarks that the articles of the treaty “shall not 
be subject to reservations”. And Article 17 states that the TPNW has unlimited duration (UNODA, 
TPNW, Text of the Treaty).
It should be noted that Article 18, establishing the relationship with other treaties and agreements, 
makes clear that “The implementation of this Treaty shall not prejudice obligations undertaken by 
States Parties with regard to existing international agreements, to which they are party, where those 
obligations are consistent with the Treaty” (UNODA, TPNW, Text of the Treaty). It is clear that the 
intention of this text is to make clear that the TPNW does not interfere with the obligations already 
assumed by the States Parties in treaties such as the NPT.
Article 19 provides that the UN Secretary-General is the official depositary of the treaty. And 
Article 20 establishes the languages of the treaty: Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian, and Spanish.
In short, in light of its preamble and the 20 articles of its text, it is perceived that the creation 
of the TPNW is due to the paralysis in the NWS disarmament efforts. It is also clear that the TPNW 
was drafted with a strong humanitarian bias, seeking to emphasize that nuclear weapons pose a risk 
to the security and prosperity of all humankind. It also highlights the human and environmental 
damage caused − or that may be caused − by nuclear weapons and, thus, places these issues at the 
heart of a UN General Assembly debate. 
It is worth recalling that the treaty was adopted with the impressive number of 122 votes in favor. 
However, TPNW’s success with regard to the wide range of prohibited activities related to nuclear 
weapons, as contained in Article 1, is also related to the actual capabilities of its States Parties to 
shape and to influence the agenda and the international system on issues related to nuclear weapons.
In this sense, the next section of this paper focuses on the analysis of the profiles of the actual 
TPNW Signatory States, whose analytical axes are their involvement with nuclear power and their 
ability to influence the international system on issues related to nuclear weapons.
Signatory States profile – their involvement with nuclear power and their ability 
to influence the international system on issues related to nuclear weapons
As already mentioned, in October 13, 2019, the TPNW had 79 Signatory States, 32 of which 
ratified the treaty. However, no NWS have signed the treaty (UNODA, TPNW, Status of the Treaty). 
It is worth noting that, in addition, only 18 of the more than 50 countries that use nuclear power 
peacefully for research purposes have signed the TPNW (World Nuclear Association).
For states that conduct some type of research in the peaceful use of nuclear energy, and that 
have at least one research reactor in operation, the ratio of research reactors between Signatory States 
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and non-Signatory States is 28/199; that is, out of a total of 227 Operational research reactors around 
the world, only 28 belong to TPNW Signatory States.4 
Table 1 shows the Signatory States of the TPNW and their respective quantities of research 
reactors either in operation or under planned construction.
Table 1 – Signatory States of the TPNW and their Research Reactors5
Signatory State Number of Research Reactors Status
Algeria 01 Operational
Austria 01 Operational
Bangladesh 01 Operational
Brazil 0401
Operational
Planned
Chile 01 Operational
Colombia 01 Operational
Ghana 01 Operational
Indonesia 03 Operational
Jamaica 01 Operational
Kazakhstan 04 Operational
Libya 01 Operational
Malaysia 01 Operational
Mexico 02 Operational
Nigeria 0101
Operational
Planned
Peru 02 Operational
South Africa 01 Operational
Thailand 01
01
Operational
Planned
Viet Nam 01
01
Operational
Planned
Total: 18 Total: 28
          04 
Operational
Planned
Source: prepared by the author based on data from the IAEA – Research Reactor Database, on October 15, 2019 (See <https://nucleus.
iaea.org/RRDB/RR/ReactorSearch.aspx>).
4 The IAEA Research Reactor Database presents quantitative information on the statuses of research reactors – operational, under 
construction, planned, shut down, under decommissioning, and decommissioned — both by region and by country (see IAEA. 
Research Reactor Database. <https://nucleus.iaea.org/RRDB/RR/ReactorSearch.aspx>). Accessed October 15, 2019.
5  Research reactors (RR) of TPNW signatory states with the status shutdown, under decommissioning, or decommissioned are 
not included in Table 1. But they are presented here: Algeria – 1 RR – temporary shutdown; Austria – 2 RR – decommissioned; Chile 
– 1 RR – shutdown; Democratic Republic of Congo – 2 RR – shutdown; Kazakhstan – 1 RR – permanent shutdown; Libya – 1 RR – 
temporary shutdown; Mexico – 1 decommissioned and 1 shutdown; Philippines – 1 RR – permanent shutdown; South Africa – 1 RR – 
decommissioned; Uruguay – 1 RR – decommissioned; Philippines – 1 RR – permanent shutdown; Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of) 
– 1 RR – permanent shutdown. (See <https://nucleus.iaea.org/RRDB/RR/ReactorSearch.aspx>).
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Regarding the use of nuclear power reactors, the number of Signatory States of the TPNW is 
even smaller. From a total of 70 Signatory States, only five either have or have had nuclear power 
reactors. According to IAEA – Nuclear Power Reactors in the World (2018, pp. 30–45), of the 454 
nuclear power reactors in operation, only 6 were from Signatory States of the TPNW. Of the 55 
nuclear power reactors under construction (IAEA, 2018, pp. 27–28), only three are from Signatory 
States of the TPNW.
Table 2 shows the TPNW Signatories States and their respective quantity of nuclear power 
reactors; that is, reactors used in generating electricity in nuclear power plants.
Table 2 – Signatory States of the TPNW and their nuclear power reactors
Signatory State Number of Power Reactors Status
Bangladesh 02 Under Construction
Brazil
02
01
Operational
Under Construction
Kazakhstan 01 Permanent Shutdown
Mexico 02 Operational
South Africa 02 Operational
Total: 5 
Total: 6
03 
01 
Operational 
Under Construction
Permanent Shutdown
Source: prepared by the author based on data from the IAEA – Power Reactor Information System (PRIS) – The Database on Nuclear 
Power Reactors, on February 28, 2019 (See <https://pris.iaea.org/PRIS/home.aspx>).
In light of Tables 1 and 2 it is clear that most of the TPNW Signatory States have no involvement 
with the peaceful use of nuclear energy, either in research or in generation of electricity by nuclear 
power plants. Of the 79 Signatory States, only 18 have some involvement with research and/or 
power generation by nuclear power reactors. That is, the Signatory States of the TPNW could be 
active in research into nuclear energy and/or be exponents of its peaceful use, which would increase 
the credibility of the treaty with the international public opinion. However, this is not the case. It 
should be noted that these data do not either denigrate or detract from the positive intentions of 
the Signatory States in relation to nuclear disarmament. However, they reveal a fact that cannot be 
disregarded when evaluating the potential of TPNW success.
If one observes the economic dimension of the TPNW Signatory States, for example, the GDP, 
it can be seen that, among the 30 states with the largest GDP in the world economy, only six are 
Signatory States of the TPNW. Table 3 shows the 30 states with the largest GDPs in 2017, with the 
Signatory States of TPNW being highlighted in yellow.
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Table 3 – Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 2017
Rank Country
GDP
(Millions of US dollars)
1 United States 19.390.604
2 China 12.237.700
3 Japan 4.872.137
4 Germany 3.677.439
5 United Kingdom 2.622.434
6 India 2.597.491
7 France 2.582.501
8 Brazil 2.055.506
9 Italy 1.934.798
10 Canada 1.653.043
11 Russian Federation 1.577.524
12 Korea, Rep. 1.530.751
13 Australia 1.323.421
14 Spain 1.311.320
15 Mexico 1.149.919
16 Indonesia 1.015.539
17 Turkey 851.102
18 Netherlands 826.200
19 Saudi Arabia 683.827
20 Switzerland 678.887
21 Argentina 637.590
22 Sweden 538.040
23 Poland 524.510
24 Belgium 492.681
25 Thailand 455.221
26 Iran, Islamic Rep. 439.514
27 Austria 416.596
28 Norway 398.832
29 United Arab Emirates 382.575
30 Nigeria 375.771
Source: The World Bank. GDP Rank. Gross Domestic Product 2017.
Results that are not very different are obtained if one observes either the military dimension 
— defense spending, for example — or the demographic dimension. In the case of the military 
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dimension, of the fifteen largest and most significant defense budgets, only one country — Brazil — is 
a Signatory State. Graphic 1 shows the ratio of the 15 largest defense expenditures in 2017.
Graphic 1 – 15 largest defense expenditures in 2017
Source: STATISTA. The 15 countries with the highest military spending worldwide in 2017 (in billion U.S. dollars). 
The point to note is that the largest military budget holders do not support the TPNW. Of the 
fifteen largest defense budgets in 2017, 14 are countries that have nuclear weapons (USA, China, 
Russia, India, France, and United Kingdom), or have military alliances with NWS (Saudi Arabia, 
Japan, Germany, South Korea, Italy, Australia, Canada, and Turkey).
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As far as the demographic dimension is concerned, most of the world population belongs to 
non-Signatory States. As of August 2018, the total population of the world exceeds 7.63 billion people. 
The 20 most populous states of the planet contain more than 5.3 billion people, that is, almost 70% 
of the population of the planet (World Population Review). If we take these countries as reference 
we can see that more than 4 billion of these 5.3 billion people are in non-Signatory States. The point 
to be highlighted for reflection is that, considering that governments represent the desire of their 
populations, most of the global population does not support TPNW. 
This is not a determining variable for the eventual failure of the TPNW in relation to its main 
objective, once the Mine Ban Treaty Mine Ban Treaty (MBT) and the Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court (ICC) also lack support, for example, from China and India. However, this variable 
cannot be disregarded in the analysis of the TPNW, nor of any other treatise that has universal goals.
Table 4 presents the list of the 20 most populous states on the planet, with the Signatory States 
of the TPNW highlighted in yellow. 
Table 4 – 20 Most Populous States
Rank Country
Population 2019
(Data based on the latest United Nations Population Division estimates)
1 China 1,420,062,022
2 India 1,368,737,513
3 USA 329,093,110
4 Indonesia 269,536,482
5 Brazil 212,392,717
6 Pakistan 204,596,442
7 Nigeria 200,962,417
8 Bangladesh 168,065,920
9 Russia 143,895,551
10 Mexico 132,328,035
11 Japan 126,854,745
12 Ethiopia 110,135,635
13 Philippines 108,106,310
14 Egypt 101,168,745
15 Viet Nam 97,429,061
16 DR Congo 86,727,573
17 Turkey 82,961,805
18 Iran 82,820,766
19 Germany 82,438,639
20 Thailand 69,306,160
Comments ●	  ∑ > 5,389 billion people
●	  Approximately 4,047 billion people in non-Signatory States.
Source: Worldometers. Countries in the world by population (2018).
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In summary, for any of the criteria that are used to assess the ability to influence the international 
system, the TPNW Signatory States are mostly ineffectual and may become system-affecting States 
only under particular circumstances and in specific forums.
A synthesis of the major absent states and a prospective view of the TPNW
The NWS are the main absentees from TPNW Signatory States. None of the NWS – de facto 
and de jure – is a member of the TPNW. If we add to this absence list the states with the biggest 
economies and even the states with the largest military budgets, we can see that the main countries 
with capacity to determine or influence the international system are non-Signatory States of the 
TPNW. Given such absences, a treaty aimed at banning nuclear weapons does not appear to have 
promising prospects of achieving that purpose.
These absences show that the TPNW ignores the current reality of states that rely on some 
degree of nuclear deterrence for their own security and defense. These states will not eliminate the 
deterrence of their national defense policy or strategy in short time and, consequently, will not 
participate in a treaty that outlaws nuclear weapons.
It is difficult to envisage that a treaty that aspires to a universal range and deals with one of 
the central issues of international security could succeed without the main actors and military and 
economic powers of the international system. What universal treatise has prospered without the 
participation of the major poles of power throughout history?
From a medium-term perspective, the TPNW cannot succeed in fulfilling its purpose without 
the participation of, for example, the USA, China, Russia, Japan, Germany, France, the UK, India, 
Canada, and Australia. Among the signatories to the TPNW, only Brazil, Mexico, and Indonesia appear 
as average powers in economic terms. Of these three states, only Brazil and Mexico are relatively 
expressive users of nuclear energy.
In this context, while commendable in its purpose, the TPNW does not include Signatory 
States capable of either determining or decisively influencing the issue of the prohibition of nuclear 
weapons. Together, the Signatory States of the TPNW come close to the category of system-affecting 
states; however, in respect of nuclear disarmament, they can influence the system only in the nuclear 
weapons debate, mainly in humanitarian and moral terms. In practical terms of nuclear disarmament, 
they do not decisively either determine or influence the system. Therefore, in light of its scope and 
current Signatory States — and non-Signatory States – the TPNW appears to be an innocuous effort 
in respect of nuclear disarmament.
Conclusions
Based on the research conducted it can be inferred that the Signatory States of the Treaty on the 
Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons are mostly ineffectual, not only economically but also in respect of 
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issues of the uses of nuclear energy. From the most condescending perspective, the TPNW is a treaty 
constituted of system-affecting states. Thus, its Signatory States are unable to decisively influence 
the international system in respect of the relevant issues of the use of nuclear energy, especially with 
regard to the nuclear disarmament of Nuclear-Weapon States (NWS).
Even with the potential of 122 Signatory States, TPNW will remain a treaty formed mostly 
by system-ineffectual states, with a few system-affecting states. It is worth noting that, even with 
this number of potential Signatory States, representing most states in the international system, the 
TPNW does not include most of the world’s population. In theory, while China, India, Pakistan, the 
USA, Russia, and most European states are outside the TPNW, most of the world’s population will 
not be supporting this treaty.
What gives TPNW some potential for success, and to achieve, even if only partially, the objectives 
contained in its preamble, is the possible public conviction of states that today are currently against 
the treaty. It seems clear that the ideals of the TPNW are aimed at long-term results, through the 
increasing co-optation of public opinion, especially of the countries that currently openly reject the 
TPNW.
This possibility may be greater in democratic states, where debates and the eventual conviction 
of such public opinion may generate pressure in their respective governments as to the validity of 
what the TPNW proposes to achieve. However, this debate may make most of the public convinced 
that nuclear weapons are necessary for the security of their countries and, therefore, cannot be 
prohibited. In that case, the TPNW would be doomed to failure.
In short, the TPNW is an innovation and a breakthrough, because the treaty makes nuclear 
weapons as big an aberration as are chemical and biological weapons. With the TPNW, the possession 
of, permission to possess, and support for the possession of nuclear weapons stigmatizes a state that is 
framed in one of these situations. In this sense, the TPNW is a breakthrough for nuclear disarmament 
efforts. However, the point to be highlighted is that the TPNW Signatory States are mostly in the 
category of system-ineffectual states, with a few system-affecting states. Therefore, in keeping with 
the current status of TPNW absences, the treaty will not be able to influence the international system 
in matters related to nuclear weapons to achieve the statement in its preamble: “the achievement and 
maintenance of a world free of nuclear weapons […]”.
As a last remark its worth to stress that the TPNW is an innovation that has raised the debate 
on nuclear disarmament to another level because it is the political and moral link capable of uniting 
the majority of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States (NNWS) and international public opinion to pressure the 
NWS to comply with Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). 
However, the TPNW will not be able to fulfill its purpose because there is neither the support of 
the main military and economic powers of the international system, nor the support of the majority 
of states that make peaceful use of nuclear energy. Moreover, the Signatory States have no ability to 
either determine or influence the international system on issues related to nuclear weapons. In this 
sense, the argument put forward in this article appears to be valid: the TPNW is both an innovation 
in the nuclear nonproliferation regime and a treaty that is unfitted to achieve its objective due the 
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lack of support from the major powers of the international system, as well as the absence of the main 
countries that could determine or influence the international system on issues related to nuclear 
weapons.
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